Raia Mutomboki: The flawed peace process in the DRC and the birth of an armed franchise

About this book

In 2011, a new kind of mobilization emerged in rural areas of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The Raia Mutomboki (‘Outraged Citizens’) was a grassroots response to rampant insecurity, in particular to the abuses perpetrated by the Forces démocratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), a largely Rwandan Hutu rebel group. Supported by customary chiefs, former militia members, and army deserters, young people rallied around the idea of dawa, magical medicines and amulets that they believe makes them invincible, and quickly drove the FDLR out of many of their former strongholds.Their appearance was testimony to the flaws of various peace deals in eastern Congo, which, while solving some security problems, have created others. In 2009, a secretive deal between the Congolese and Rwandan governments succeeded in integrating some armed groups into the army, but was made conditional on a series of offensives against the FDLR, which in turn triggered massive displacement and revenge attacks by all sides against civilians. The restructuring of the army—the so-called ‘regimentation process’—was launched in 2011 as a corrective to the favouring of certain former armed groups in the army, but ended up entrenching that favouritism, leading to a series of defections and additional tension.The unintended consequences of these deals played a crucial role in transforming the Raia Mutomboki from a parochial militia to a series of groups deployed across an area the size of Belgium. Today, the name applies to a series of different armed groups, bound by the same name and broad ideology of self-defence. It is more a franchise than a unitary force, with each of its branches rooted in a particular set of dynamics driven by local politics, its leadership, and the interests of its allies.The absence of the Congolese state has played an important role in this mobilization by neglecting and at times even exacerbating local conflicts. However, while the Raia Mutomboki began as self-defence forces, they have in many places evolved into a brutal and abusive militia, killing hundreds of civilians and setting up illegal tax schemes. Demobilizing the groups will require addressing the security challenges posed by the FDLR, and crafting a militia demobilization programme that applies lessons learned from past mistakes. Perhaps the stiffest challenge—one common to dealing with all armed groups in the Kivus—will be improving local state capacity to prevent conflicts over customary power and land from seeping into armed mobilization, and to provide necessary protection and security for local populations.