Probably Problematic: Huemer’s Ontological Proof of Moral Realism

About this book

Michael Huemer has constructed what he believes to be an ontological proof of moral realism. Roughly speaking, he thinks that given that it’s possible moral realism is true, and thus possible we have objective moral reasons to do certain actions, then we do have objective moral reasons to do certain actions. This essay sets out to critique Huemer’s Argument. The first section discusses the relevant background theory in meta-ethics and reasons. The second section states Huemer’s argument and explains how it works. The third section highlights some problems for the Probabilistic Reasons Principle that Huemer bases his argument on, in particular the complications surrounding the interrelation of factors when determining the existence and strength of reasons. The fourth section explains why Huemer must deal with the interrelation of factors or face a reductio ad absurdum against his argument. The fifth section points out some of the counter-intuitive reasons that are generated from the premises of Huemer’s argument. Finally, section six delivers a verdict on Huemer’s argument.