Raymond L. Garthoff

The Soviet response to the first edition of Reflections has been a prime example of the new openness under glasnost in discussing previously taboo subjects. Using new revelations—such as the fact that Moscow had twice as many troops in Cuba as the Kennedy administration believed—from key Soviet and Cuban Sources, Garthoff has revised his earlier analysis to produce the most accurate, eye-opening story yet of the 1963 crisis. In this book Raymond L. Garthoff, a participant in the crisis deliberations of the U.S. government, reflects on the nature of the crisis, it's consequences, and it's lessons for the future. He provides a unique combination of memoir, historical analysis, and political interpretations. He gives particular attention to the aftermath and "afterlife" of the crisis and to its bearing on current and future policy. In the first edition of the book in 1987 the Garthoff presented a number of facts for the first time. Since then, more information has become available, particularly form Soviet sources, in part from conferences in which Garthoff participated but even more from individual interviews and research. This new information, much of it presented here in this volume for the first time, helps to fill in gaps in our knowledge about events and motivations on the Soviet side. More importantly, it enlarges our understanding of the crisis interaction.

In this revised edition of his well-received 1985 volume, Raymond Gathoff incorporates newly declassified secret Russian as well as American materials into his account of American-Soviet relations from 1969-1980. The book considers both the broader context of world politics and internal political considerations and developments, and examines these developments as experienced by both sides. It also recounts how differences in ideology, perceptions, aims and interests were key determinants of both US and Soviet policies.

During the Cold War, the political leadership of the Soviet Union avidly sought intelligence about its main adversary, the United States. Although effective on an operational level, Soviet leaders and their intelligence chiefs fell short when it came to analyzing intelligence. Soviet leaders were often not receptive to intelligence that conflicted with their existing beliefs, and analysts were reluctant to put forward assessments that challenged ideological orthodoxy. There were, however, important changes over time. Ultimately the views of an enlightened Soviet leader, Gorbachev, trumped the ideological blinders of his predecessors and the intelligence service's dedication to an endless duel with their ideologically spawned "main adversary," making it possible to end the Cold War. Raymond Garthoff draws on over five decades of personal contact with Soviet diplomats, intelligence officers, military leaders, and scholars during his remarkable career as an analyst, senior diplomat, and historian. He also builds on previous scholarship and examines documents from Soviet and Western archives. Soviet Leaders and Intelligence offers an informed and highly readable assessment of how the Soviets understood―and misunderstood―the intentions and objectives of their Cold War adversary.

Raymond L. Garthoff examines the fateful final decade of U.S.- Soviet relations, from the start of the Reagan administration in 1981 through the end of the Soviet era-- the collapse of the communist bloc, the end of Gorbachev's failed perestroika, and the demise of the Soviet Union itself at the end of 1991. While standing on its own, the book is a sequel to the author's earlier acclaimed, Détente and American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, which covers the period 1969-1980.This volume features a detailed examination of the perspectives and actions of both the United States and the Soviet Union and their interaction, including the interrelationships of domestic factors with foreign and security policies in both countries and the involvement of both powers with other countries around the world, which infringed on their direct relationship. Besides analyzing the turn from confrontation to détente over the years of the Reagan and Bush administrations and Brezhnev through the Gorbachev administration, it reflects on the significance of the great transition from the cold war to a new era. It thus illuminates the very relevant recent history that underlines and informs American-Russian relations and the new situation of a post-Soviet, post-cold war world.Garthoff has obtained access to many formerly secret Soviet documents on this period in the Russian archives, as well as to a number of official American documents that have only recently been declassified. In addition, he has been able to interview and discuss the issues with many active or former Soviet and American officials.The author concludes that the key development was the advent of a Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who recognized the need to cast off a failed world view and to end the cold war-- and who successfully moved with the United States, under the Reagan and Bush administrations, and others, to achieve that goal; notwithstanding his failure in the parallel attempt to revitalize and transform the Soviet Union.Selected by Choice as an Outstanding Book of 1994

"In this memoir, Ambassador Ray Garthoff paints a dynamic diplomatic history of the cold war, tracing the life of the conflict from the vantage points of an observant insider. His intellectually formative years coincided with the earliest days of the cold war, and during his forty-year career, Garthoff participated in some of the most important policymaking of the twentieth • In the late 1950s he carried out pioneering research on Soviet military affairs at the Rand Corporation. • During his four-year tenure at the CIA (1957-61), in addition to drafting national intellingence estimates, Garthoff made trips to the Soviet Union with Vice President Richard Nixon and as an interpreter for a delegation from the Atomic Energy Commission. • As a special assistant in the State Department, Garthoff worked with Secretary Dean Rusk., and he was directly involved in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Later he served as executive officer and senior State Department adviser for the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) delegation. • In the 1970s he served as a senior Foreign Service inspector, leading missions to a number of countries around the globe. • As U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria (1977-79), Garthoff gained first-hand knowledge of the workings of a communist state and of the Soviet bloc. • In the 1980s, Garthoff wrote two major studies of American-Soviet relations. He traveled to the Soviet Union nearly a dozen times in the final decade of the cold war, and in the early 1990s he had access to the former Soviet Communist Party archives in Moscow. Garthoff¡'s journey through the Cold War informs the views, positions, and actions of the past. His anecdotes and observations will be of great value to those anticipating the challenges of reevaluating American post-cold war security policy."

The fundamental question underlying one government's assessments of another, particularly an adversary, pertains to its intentions. If it is perceived to be an adversary, a competitor, and an opponent, that question has been answered, at least in part. Other questions concerning intention nonetheless remain are the adversary's aims limited or unlimited; are its designs and plans for expanding its influences set or flexible, limited or constrained; do its policies pose a direct or indirect challenge; do its predicted actions create a need for countermeasures, including measures to lead off threats before they materialize? Clearly, such questions must embrace capabilities as well as intentions, inasmuch as policies and actions are necessarily based on relative capabilities. What are its potentialities, particularly to cause harm, and what are its vulnerabilities to one's own actions?In this volume, Raymond L. Garthoff answers these questions surrounding the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy and military estimates of the Soviet Union. Much has been written concerning the beginning of the Cold War, but never has an author used the historic record and remanufactured the outcomes and diplomatic charges in such a fascinating way. This is truly a unique presentation of the historical record, which allows the reader to relate to a fascinating and dark period of diplomacy and foreign policy.

This book, first published in 1954, is a key analysis of the guiding policies, basic assumptions, fundamental principles and methods of the Red Army, in many respects the most powerful force in the Cold War. This analysis examines the strategy and tactics, weapons systems, training, discipline and political doctrine of the Red Army, as well as focusing on the political control of the USSR and its satellite states.

Originally published in 1953, Soviet Military Doctrine by Soviet analyst Raymond L. Garthoff was prepared as part of the research program undertaken for the United States Air Force by The RAND Corporation. At the time of its first publication, Soviet Military Doctrine was the most complete and authoritative study available of the basic military science of the USSR.“Garthoff again joins the debate on nuclear deterrence and Moscow’s military intentions. He draws on previously confidential Soviet sources—including a complete file of the Soviet general staff journal—to interpret new developments and changes in the Kremlin’s strategic policy. Highly recommended for academic libraries.”—James R. Kuhlman, University of Georgia Library, Athens

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Book by garthoff, raymond

Book by Garthoff, Raymond L.

Garthoff, Raymond L.

Book by Garthoff, Raymond L.

Dramatic changes under way in the Soviet union and the world have significant implications for American security policy. Soviet expert Raymond L. Garthoff makes use of unique, newly available material-- including a complete file of the confidential Soviet General Staff journal-- to illuminate the development of Soviet military thinking. In this groundbreaking study, Garthoff explains that the Soviets regard nuclear deterrence only as a necessary interim safeguard, not a solution to the quest for security. He examines the implications of the "remarkable recasting of the Soviet concept of security" for U.S. policy and global security.

Book by Garthoff, Raymond L.