Philip H. Gordon

One of Foreign Affairs' Best of Books of 2021 and "Books For The Century"!"Book of the Week" on Fareed Zakaria GPSFinancial Times Best Books of 2020The definitive account of how regime change in the Middle East has proven so tempting to American policymakers for decades―and why it always seems to go wrong."It's a first-rate work, intelligently analyzing a complex issue, and learning the right lessons from history."― Fareed ZakariaSince the end of World War II, the United States has set out to oust governments in the Middle East on an average of once per decade ― in places as diverse as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan (twice), Egypt, Libya, and Syria. The reasons for these interventions have also been extremely diverse, and the methods by which the United States pursued regime change have likewise been highly varied, ranging from diplomatic pressure alone to outright military invasion and occupation. What is common to all the operations, however, is that they failed to achieve their ultimate goals, produced a range of unintended and even catastrophic consequences, carried heavy financial and human costs, and in many cases left the countries in question worse off than they were before.Philip H. Gordon's Losing the Long Game is a thorough and riveting look at the U.S. experience with regime change over the past seventy years, and an insider’s view on U.S. policymaking in the region at the highest levels. It is the story of repeated U.S. interventions in the region that always started out with high hopes and often the best of intentions, but never turned out well. No future discussion of U.S. policy in the Middle East will be complete without taking into account the lessons of the past, especially at a time of intense domestic polarization and reckoning with America's standing in world.

A thorough analysis of where U.S./European relations have gone wrong--and how to set them rightALLIES AT WAR is the first and most comprehensive assessment of what went wrong between America and Europe during the crisis over Iraq and is based on extensive interviews with policymakers in the United States and Europe.It puts the crisis over Iraq in historical context by examining US-Europe relations since World War II and shows how the alliance traditionally managed to overcome its many internal difficulties and crises. It describes how the deep strategic differences that emerged at the end of the Cold War and the disputes over the Balkans and the Middle East during the Clinton years already had some analysts questioning whether the Alliance could survive. It shows how the Bush administration's unilateral diplomacy and world-view helped bring already simmering tensions to a boil, and describes in depth the events leading up to the Iraq crisis of 2003.Gordon and Shapiro explain how powerful forces such rising American power and the September 11 terrorist attacks have made relations between America and Europe increasingly difficult. But the authors argue that the split over Iraq was not inevitable: it was the result of misguided decisions and unnecessary provocations on both sides. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that claims that the Iraq war signaled the effective end of the Atlantic Alliance, the authors warn that assuming the end of the Alliance could quickly become a self-fulfilling prophesy: leaving the United States isolated, resented, and responsible for bearing the burdens of maintaining international security largely alone.In response to those who argue that theAtlantic Alliance is no longer viable or necessary, ALLIES AT WAR demonstrates that even after Iraq, the United States and Europe can work together, and indeed must if they wish to effectively address the most pressing problems of our age. The book makes concrete proposals for restoring transatlantic relations and updating the alliance to meet new challenges like global terrorism and the transformation of an unstable Middle East.

"Turkey has always been a the point where East meets West, Europe meets Asia, and Christianity meets Islam. Turkey has also been a close and important American ally, but a series of converging political and strategic factors have now endangered its longstanding Western and democratic orientation. In Winning Turkey, two leading analysts explain this worrisome situation and present a plan for improving it. The stakes are clear. Turkey is the most advanced democracy in the Islamic world, bordering a number of the world's hotspots, including Iraq, Iran, and the Caucasus. It occupies the corridor between Western markets and Caspian Sea energy reserves. A stable, Western-oriented Turkey moving toward EU membership would provide a growing market for exports, a source of needed labor, a positive influence on the Middle East, and an ally in the war on terror. The picture has darkened, however, as rising anti-Americanism, deflated hopes for EU accession, civil-military tensions, and terrorist threats have destabilized an already volatile Turkish political system. Wi nning Turkey d esigns a plan to ease tensions in this critical part of the world. In addition to proposing a ""grand bargain"" between Turkey and the Kurds, it advocates greater support for increased liberalism and democracy, a renewed commitment by both Europe and Turkey to promote EU membership, a historic compromise with Armenia, and greater Western engagement with Turkish Cypriots."

"In August 1999 a forty-six-year-old sheep farmer name José Bové was arrested for dismantling the construction site of a new McDonald's restaurant in the south of France. A few months later Bové built on his fame by smuggling huge chunks of Roquefort cheese into Seattle, where he was among the leaders of the antiglobalization protests against the World Trade Organization summit. Bové's crusade against globalization helped provoke a debate both within France and beyond about the pros and cons of a world in which financial, commercial, human, cultural, and technology flows move faster and more extensively than ever before. As the French struggle to preserve the country's identity, heritage, and distinctiveness, they are nonetheless adapting to a new economy and an interdependent world. This book deals with France's effort to adapt to globalization and its consequences for France's economy, cultural identity, domestic politics, and foreign relations. The authors begin by analyzing the structural transformation of the French economy, driven first by liberalization within the European Union and more recently by globalization. By examining a wide variety of possible measures of globalization and liberalization, the authors conclude that the French economy's adaptation has been far reaching and largely successful, even if French leaders prefer to downplay the extent of these changes in response to political pressures and public opinion. They call this adaptation ""globalization by stealth."" The authors also examine the relationship between trade, culture, and identity and explain why globalization has rendered the three inseparable. They show how globalization is contributing to the restructuring of the traditional French political spectrum and blurring the traditional differences between left and right. Finally, they explore France's effort to tame globalization—maîtriser la mondialisation—and the possible consequences and lessons of the French stance for the rest of the world."

“An absolutely brilliant book . . . the most clearly argued critique yet of the Bush administration’s flawed approach to defeating jihadist terrorism.”—Peter Bergen, author of Holy War, Inc. Six years into the “war on terror,” are the United States and its allies safer than they were before it started? Sadly, we are not, and the reason is that we are fighting—and losing—the wrong war. In this paradigm-shifting book, Philip H. Gordon presents a new way of thinking about the war on terror and a new strategy for winning it. He draws a provocative parallel between the war on terror and the Cold War, showing how defense, development, diplomacy, and the determination to maintain our own values can again be deployed alongside military might to defeat a hostile and insidious ideology. Gordon also asks, “What would victory look like?”—a topic sorely missing from the debate today. He offers a positive vision of the world after the war on terror, which will end not when we kill or capture all potential terrorists but when their hateful ideology collapses. Gordon’s strategy for achieving this goal is achievable and realistic, but only if the United States changes course before it is too late.

As France begins to confront the new challenges of the post-Cold War era, the time has come to examine how French security policy has evolved since Charles de Gaulle set it on an independent course in the 1960s. Philip Gordon shows that the Gaullist model, contrary to widely held beliefs, has lived on--but that its inherent inconsistencies have grown more acute with increasing European unification, the diminishing American military role in Europe, and related strains on French military budgets. The question today is whether the Gaullist legacy will enable a strong and confident France to play a full role in Europe's new security arrangements or whether France, because of its will to independence, is destined to play an isolated, national role.Gordon analyzes military doctrines, strategies, and budgets from the 1960s to the 1990s, and also the evolution of French policy from the early debates about NATO and the European Community to the Persian Gulf War. He reveals how and why Gaullist ideas have for so long influenced French security policy and examines possible new directions for France in an increasingly united but potentially unstable Europe.

Whether Europe will ever have anything resembling the “common foreign and security policy” described in the Maastricht Treaty will depend most of all on whether France and Germany are able to align their foreign policy goals and means. This thoughtful and original study examines the Franco-German security partnership in its post–Cold War context and analyzes the implications of that partnership for both Europe and the United States. Utilizing French and German sources and extensive interviews in Paris, Bonn, and Washington, Philip Gordon traces the evolution of Franco-German security cooperation since World War II, focusing especially on post-1989 developments. The book’s historical and conceptual approach provides a framework for assessing the foundations of the Euro-optimism and -pessimism at odds with each other today.Gordon argues that Franco-German cooperation in the post–Cold War era will be more challenging than it was during a time when the Soviet threat united the two countries in a U.S.-led alliance. The book demonstrates how the end of the Cold War, German unification, a declining U.S. role in Europe, and emerging instabilities to Europe’s east and south will test the strength of the Franco-German partnership, and it examines how French and German leaders have stood up to the new challenges so far. Detailed case studies of the Persian Gulf War, the debates over the “Eurocorps,” policies toward Eastern Europe, and the war in Yugoslavia make an invaluable contribution to our understanding of French, German, and Alliance policies in the post–Cold War world. Gordon also identifies new trends in French and German security policies since 1989 and analyzes their effects on the potential for Western and European cohesion.The book concludes that the general commitment in Paris and Berlin to continued cooperation is not in doubt but that a truly common and effective Franco-German or European security policy is unlikely; the national interests of the two countries and their Western partners not only remain different, but they are probably more divergent today than during the Cold War. Consequently, Gordon also argues that U.S. and European fears of Franco-German bilateralism are exaggerated and indeed that the allies have more to gain than to lose from Franco-German cooperation. The problem for the West is not so much that France and Germany have formed a cohesive political-military force within Europe but that they have failed to do so.

This timely volume assesses NATO's current accomplishments, continuing challenges, and potential pitfalls. Leading international scholars and policymakers explore three key themes influencing NATO's future: transatlantic relations, the debate over enlargement, and the organization's new functions. Weighing the fate of an alliance poised for renewal or decline, the contributors offer informed analysis and discussion of an organization that has changed profoundly over the past five years and continues to evolve in the face of an uncertain global environment.