P. Edward Haley

Offers direct answers to the main questions about Qaddafi and U.S. policy toward Libya.

In a critical overview of U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, P. Edward Haley draws surprising connections between key elements of George W. Bush's foreign policy and those of his predecessor, Bill Clinton. Haley further shows how these elements in both cases produced disastrous results, and he proposes an alternative that is constructive and tolerant but not amorally "realistic." Specifically, Strategies of Dominance faults reliance on American exceptionalism, treatment of globalization and global democratization as vital to security, a misreading of American primacy, expectation of bandwagoning by allies, and reliance on economic sanctions and coercive diplomacy. Haley argues that these characteristics have replaced a more tolerant Cold War–era program in which such attitudes were tempered by recognition of a bipolar world, a nuclear standoff, and a global zero-sum competition for allies and influence. This is the only book covering the foreign policies of all three post–Cold War presidents―George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, and George W. Bush. And although a number of books have criticized the foreign policy of George W. Bush, no other shows how its post–Cold War underpinnings are shared with Clinton's and to a more limited degree with those of his father.

American response to foreign revolution is the theme of this carefully documented diplomatic history of the attitudes and policies of Presidents Taft and Wilson toward revolt in Mexico. Professor Haley's detailed examination is based on extensive research in the papers of members of both administrations and in State Department records. Part One of his book describes the setting of the Mexican conflict and investigates the Taft administration's response toward protecting American lives and property in Mexico (1910 to 1913). Part Two takes up the outbreak of revolutionary civil war and the Wilson administration's attempt to control the course of events (1913 to 1917). This study of the Mexican experience points up problems presented to the U.S. government by uprisings in any country where there are considerable American interests, and in an epilogue the author suggests ways in which the United States might fashion a new response to revolution abroad.The diplomacy of Taft and Wilson in fact reflected two Americas, "the one fleshy, corporate, and pragmatic, the other ascetic, religious, and idealistic." Economic expansion and the acquisition of foreign markets and investments called into being Taft's "Dollar Diplomacy," which was reflected in Mexico by his emphasis on nonintervention during a relatively tranquil period but tempered by his willingness to place order above reform when it came to protecting and stabilizing American interests there. On the other hand, the "New Diplomacy" of Woodrow Wilson reflected his desire to lead other nations to transcend traditional patterns of action and to conform to the American and British model of political development. When war broke out in Mexico, Wilson tried but failed to persuade the two sides to accept an armistice and a neutral provisional government until national elections could be held to establish a new constitutional government. The author seeks to explain the paradox of Wilson's diplomacy--his constant meddling with unrealistic proposals for mediation and his outright support of the Constitutionalist revolutionaries.These diplomacies, Professor Haley points out, offer lessons with contemporary applicability. The Mexican revolution is linked to other twentieth-century uprisings in several ways: in fierce regulation of private property and of foreign investment, and in emphasis on social welfare rather than on political freedom. Lack of anti-communist sentiment makes the experience particularly useful for those who are interested in determining the influence of communism on America's response to later revolutions. The author concludes that in responding to revolution, foreign governments must choose between intervention by overwhelming force at an early stage (Russia in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, America in the Dominican Republic), and the frustrating pursuit of influence through diplomacy with a smaller range of possibilities and lower priorities. Attempts like Wilson's to find a middle ground of limited intervention in a social revolution invite entanglement and failure. Meanwhile, he adds, Mexican diplomatic skill in exploiting the inconsistencies of Wilson's administration demonstrated a deep understanding of American politics and should provide a model that countries in Latin America would do well to look toward.

Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control, And The Future [Sep 10, 1985] Haley, P. Edward; Keithly, David M.; Merritt, Jack and Needler, Martin C

Book by Haley, P. E.

This book covers the Reagan administration's original proposal; the main disagreements about strategic and technical feasibility; the effects of Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union; and the effects of SDI on relations between the U.S. and its allies.