David Lloyd Dusenbury

Why was Jesus, who said I judge no one, put to death for a political crime? Of course, this is a historical question--but it is not only historical. Jesus's life became a philosophical theme in the first centuries of our era, when pagan and Christian philosophers clashed over the meaning of his sayings and the significance of his death. Modern philosophers, too, such as Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche, have tried to retrace the arc of Jesus's life and death.I Judge No One is a philosophical reading of the four memoirs, or gospels, that were fashioned by early Christ-believers and collected in the New Testament. It offers original ways of seeing a deeply enigmatic figure who calls himself the Son of Man.David Lloyd Dusenbury suggests that Jesus offered his contemporaries a scandalous double claim. First, that human judgements are pervasive and deceptive; and second, that even divine laws can only be fulfilled in the human experience of love. Though his life led inexorably to a grim political death, what Jesus's sayings revealed--and still reveal--is that our highest desires lie beyond the political.

The gospels and ancient historians agree: Jesus was sentenced to death by Pontius Pilate, the Roman imperial prefect in Jerusalem. To this day, Christians of all churches confess that Jesus died 'under Pontius Pilate'. But what exactly does that mean?Within decades of Jesus' death, Christians began suggesting that it was the Judaean authorities who had crucified Jesus--a notion later echoed in the Qur'an. In the third century, one philosopher raised the notion that, although Pilate had condemned Jesus, he'd done so justly; this idea survives inone of the main strands of modern New Testament criticism. So what is the truth of the matter? And what is the history of that truth?David Lloyd Dusenbury reveals Pilate's 'innocence' as not only a neglected theological question, but a recurring theme in the history of European political thought. He argues that Jesus' interrogation by Pilate, and Augustine of Hippo's North African sermon on that trial, led to the concept ofsecularity and the logic of tolerance emerging in early modern Europe. Without the Roman trial of Jesus, and the arguments over Pilate's innocence, the history of empire--from the first century to the twenty-first--would have been radically different.

This book discusses how Plato, one the fiercest legal critics in ancient Greece, became – in the longue durée – its most influential legislator. Making use of a vast scholarly literature, and offering original readings of a number of dialogues, it argues that the need for legal critique and the desire for legal permanence set the long arc of Plato’s corpus—from the Apology to the Laws.Modern philosophers and legal historians have tended to overlook the fact that Plato was the most prolific legislator in ancient Greece. In the pages of his Republic and Laws, he drafted more than 700 statutes. This is more legal material than can be credited to the archetypal Greek legislators—Lycurgus, Draco, and Solon.The status of Plato’s laws is unique, since he composed them for purely hypothetical cities. And remarkably, he introduced this new genre by writing hard-hitting critiques of the Greek ideal of the sovereignty of law.Writing in the milieu in which immutable divine law vied for the first time with volatile democratic law, Plato rejected both sources of law, and sought to derive his laws from what he called ‘political technique’ (politikê technê). At the core of this technique is the question of how the idea of justice relates to legal and institutional change.Filled with sharp observations and bold claims, Platonic Legislations shows that it is possible to see Plato—and our own legal culture—in a new light“In this provocative, intelligent, and elegant work D. L. Dusenbury has posed crucial questions not only as regards Plato’s thought in the making, but also as regards our contemporaneity.”—Giorgio Camassa, University of Udine“There is a tension in Greek law, and in Greek legal thinking, between an understanding of law as unchangeable and authoritative, and a recognition that formal rules are often insufficient for the interpretation of reality, and need to be constantly revised to match it. Dusenbury’s book illuminates the sophistication of Plato’s legal thought in its engagement with this tension, and explores the potential of Plato’s reflection for modern legal theory.”—Mirko Canevaro, The University of Edinburgh

Nemesius of Emesa's On Human Nature ( De Natura Hominis ) is the first Christian anthropology. Written in Greek, circa 390 CE, it was read in half a dozen languages--from Baghdad to Oxford--well into the early modern period. Nemesius' text circulated in two Latin versions in the centuries that saw the rise of European universities, shaping scholastic theories of human nature. During the Renaissance there were numerous print editions helping to inspire a new discourse of human dignity.David Lloyd Dusenbury offers the first monograph in English on Nemesius' treatise. In the interpretation offered here, the Syrian bishop seeks to define the human qua human. His early Christian anthropology is cosmopolitan. He writes, 'Things that are natural are the same for all.' In his pages, a host of texts and discourses--biblical and medical, legal and philosophical--are made to converge upon a decisive tenet of Christian late humans' natural freedom. For Nemesius, reason and choice are a divine double-strand of powers. Since he believes that both are a natural human inheritance, he concludes that much is 'in our power'.Nemesius defines humans as the only living beings who are at once ruler (intellect) and ruled (body). Because of this, the human is a 'little world', binding the rationality of angels to the flux of elements, the tranquillity of plants, and the impulsiveness of animals. This compelling study traces Nemesius' reasoning through the whole of On Human Nature , as he seeks to give a long-influential image of humankind both philosophical and anatomical proof.

Nemesius of Emesa's On Human Nature (De Natura Hominis) is the first Christian anthropology. Written in Greek, circa 390 CE, it was read in half a dozen languages—from Baghdad to Oxford—well into the early modern period. Nemesius' text circulated in two Latin versions in the centuries that saw the rise of European universities, shaping scholastic theories of human nature. During the Renaissance there were numerous print editions helping to inspirea new discourse of human dignity.David Lloyd Dusenbury offers the first monograph in English on Nemesius' treatise. In the interpretation offered here, the Syrian bishop seeks to define the human qua human. His early Christian anthropology is cosmopolitan. He writes, 'Things that are natural are the same for all.' In his pages, a host of texts and discourses—biblical and medical, legal and philosophical—are made to converge upon a decisive tenet of Christian late humans' natural freedom. For Nemesius,reason and choice are a divine double-strand of powers. Since he believes that both are a natural human inheritance, he concludes that much is 'in our power'.Nemesius defines humans as the only living beings who are at once ruler (intellect) and ruled (body). Because of this, the human is a 'little world', binding the rationality of angels to the flux of elements, the tranquillity of plants, and the impulsiveness of animals. This compelling study traces Nemesius' reasoning through the whole of On Human Nature, as he seeks to give a long-influential image of humankind both philosophical and anatomical proof.

"With the killing of the Jews I had nothing to do. I never killed a Jew, or a non-Jew, I just did not do it."1 These are the words of Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi war criminal captured by the state of Israel in 1961. At his highly publicized trial, he was tried for three membership of criminal organizations, crimes against humanity, and crimes against the Jewish people.2 His central attempt at defense was just what the quote said; he had never killed anyone, nor was he directly responsible for the death of anyone, Jewish or not. This is something that philosophers and historians alike have wrestled with. While many of those responsible for the Holocaust were deeply racist, sadistic, antisemitic individuals, many were not, and were instead cogs in a violent machine of racism and murder. Hannah Arendt's work Eichmann in Jerusalem popularized this discussion of diffusion of responsibility and guilt in the Holocaust. At the time, with the stance being taken by his defense at the trial, it is obvious why Arendt viewed Eichmann in the way she did. Philosopher Susan Neiman wrote describing Arendt's perspective, "Arendt's account was crucial in revealing what makes Auschwitz emblematic for contemporary evil. It showed that today, even crimes so immense that the earth itself cries out for retribution are committed by people with motives that are no worse than banal."3 Eichmann was not banal in his evil, nor is he someone who can hide his guilt behind the guise of diffused responsibility. Nevertheless, the problems brought up by his trial and perception of it are very worth considering. How should the diffusion of responsibility and non-violent and unintentional participation in the Holocaust be viewed? How should those individuals be perceived in terms of guilt and culpability?

This book discusses how Plato, one the fiercest legal critics in ancient Greece, became – in the longue durée – its most influential legislator. Making use of a vast scholarly literature, and offering original readings of a number of dialogues, it argues that the need for legal critique and the desire for legal permanence set the long arc of Plato’s corpus—from the Apology to the Laws.Modern philosophers and legal historians have tended to overlook the fact that Plato was the most prolific legislator in ancient Greece. In the pages of his Republic and Laws, he drafted more than 700 statutes. This is more legal material than can be credited to the archetypal Greek legislators—Lycurgus, Draco, and Solon.The status of Plato’s laws is unique, since he composed them for purely hypothetical cities. And remarkably, he introduced this new genre by writing hard-hitting critiques of the Greek ideal of the sovereignty of law.Writing in the milieu in which immutable divine law vied for the first time with volatile democratic law, Plato rejected both sources of law, and sought to derive his laws from what he called ‘political technique’ (politikê technê). At the core of this technique is the question of how the idea of justice relates to legal and institutional change.Filled with sharp observations and bold claims, Platonic Legislations shows that it is possible to see Plato—and our own legal culture—in a new light“In this provocative, intelligent, and elegant work D. L. Dusenbury has posed crucial questions not only as regards Plato’s thought in the making, but also as regards our contemporaneity.”—Giorgio Camassa, University of Udine“There is a tension in Greek law, and in Greek legal thinking, between an understanding of law as unchangeable and authoritative, and a recognition that formal rules are often insufficient for the interpretation of reality, and need to be constantly revised to match it. Dusenbury’s book illuminates the sophistication of Plato’s legal thought in its engagement with this tension, and explores the potential of Plato’s reflection for modern legal theory.”—Mirko Canevaro, The University of Edinburgh