B.H. Liddell Hart

When Liddell Hart's Sherman was first published in 1929, it received encomiums such as these:"A masterly performance . . . one of the most thorougly dignified, one of the most distinguished biographies of the year." -- Henry Steele Commager, New York Herald Tribune"It is not often that one comes upon a biography that is so well done as this book. Nearly every page bears evidence of the fact that it is the product of painstaking and exhaustive research, mature thought, and an expert understanding of the subject in hand . . ." -- Saturday Review of Literature

The German Generals who survived Hitler's Reich talk over World War II with Capt. Liddell Hart, noted British miltary strategist and writer. They speak as professional soldiers to a man they know and respect. For the first time, answers are revealed to many questions raised during the war. Was Hitler the genius of strategy he seemed to be at first? Why did his Generals never overthrow him? Why did Hitler allow the Dunkirk evacuation? Current interest, of course, focuses on the German Generals' opinion of the Red Army as a fighting force. What did the Russians look like from the German side? How did we look? And what are the advantages and disadvantages under which dictator-controlled armies fight? In vivid, non-technical language, Capt. Liddell Hart reports these interviews and evaluates the vital military lessons of World War II.

"The most important book by one of the outstanding military authorities of our time." – Library Journal This is the classic book on war as we know it. During his long life, Basil H. Liddell Hart was considered one of the world's foremost military thinkers--a man generally regarded as the "Clausewitz of the 20th century." Strategy is a seminal work of military history and theory, a perfect companion to Sun-tzu’s The Art of War and Carl von Clauswitz’s On War. Liddell Hart stressed movement, flexibility, and surprise. He saw that in most military campaigns dislocation of the enemy's psychological and physical balance is prelude to victory. This dislocation results from a strategic indirect approach. Reflect for a moment on the results of direct confrontation (trench war in WW I) versus indirect dislocation (Blitzkreig in WW II). Liddell Hart is also tonic for business and political planning: just change the vocabulary and his concepts fit.

Scipio Africanus (236-183 B.C.) was one of the most exciting and dynamic leaders in history. As commander he never lost a battle. Yet it is his adversary, Hannibal, who has lived on in the public memory, due mostly to his daring march through the Alps with his elephants. At the Battle of the Ticinus, Hannibal's initial encounter with Roman arms, young Scipio first tasted warfare, rescuing his dangerously wounded, encircled father, who was also the Roman commander. By nineteen Scipio was the equivalent of a staff colonel and in 210 B.C. he was placed in supreme command. In three years he destroyed Carthaginian power in Spain and, after being made consul, took his forces to Africa, where he conquered Carthage's great ally, Syphax. Two years later he clashed with Hannibal himself, annihilating his army in the decisive Battle of Zama. For this triumph and his other exploits in the Punic Wars, Scipio was awarded the title Africanus.In his fascinating portrait of this extraordinary commander, B. H. Liddell Hart writes, "The age of generalship does not age, and it is because Scipio's battles are richer in stratagems and ruses -- many still feasible today -- than those of any other commander in history that they are an unfailing object lesson." Not only military enthusiasts and historians but all those interested in outstanding men will find this magnificent study absorbing and gripping.

History of the Second World War, B. H. Liddell Hart's last work as well as his magnum opus, embodies the fruits of twenty years of research and a lifetime of thinking on war. It abounds with controversial judgments, including provocative assertions about the true causes behind France's defeat in 1940, Hitler's failed invasion of Russia, and Japan's stunning victory at Pearl Harbor; the effectiveness of the Allies' strategic bombing of Germany; the questionable necessity of detonating atom bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki; and much more. This monumental history is both a crowning achievement and a final summation by one of the greatest military thinkers of the twentieth century.

"A must read for both the people & the leaders of ALL the dictatorial regimes around the world (democracies would also surely benefit). A book for all times to come. His understanding & explanation of where the real power lies is outstanding. What s breathtaking is how relevent his arguments are today & how strikingly similar the working of all governments turn out to be (as generalized by Hart). He deals with issues such as 'patterns & psychology of dictatorship', 'power politics in a democracy' & lastly the the 'desire for power' & 'War'."--Ali S. Burki.Summary:Preface Foreword Part 1: History & truth Part 2: Government & freedom Part 3: War & peace Conclusions

Captain B. H. Liddell Hart is the foremost authority on World War I. In The Real War, the author has fused exhaustive research and creative brilliance with brevity and precision. Thus we have in one volume the war transformed into literature - an understandable, kaleidoscopic masterwork of military history.This 1935 hardcover edition of THE REAL WAR was updated, revised and added to somewhat, and retitled A HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR, and a new Introduction was also added.

T. E. Shaw, better known as Lawrence of Arabia, was one of the most romantic, heroic, and enigmatic figures of his day. The subject of myth and hagiography, he was equally accomplished in several fields -- as archaeologist, diplomat, writer, and soldier -- and he worked throughout World War I and after in the Middle East in efforts to promote independent Arab states. His autobiography Seven Pillars of Wisdom is one of the greatest works of its kind. The esteemed military historian B. H. Liddell Hart wrote this study of Lawrence in order to pierce the clouds of legend. He discussed Lawrence's Oxford days, his experiences as an intelligence officer in Egypt, and in particular the tactics of guerrilla warfare he practiced so effectively against the large Turkish armies during World War I. Liddell Hart was one of the few to give Lawrence his full justice as both a man and a brilliant soldier. Long out-of-print, this book unravels the many puzzling features of Lawrence's story and restores him to his proper place as one of the twentieth century's heroic, but very human, figures.

In the PAN GRAND STRATEGY series, this is an account of Germany's generals, including their own version of the military events of 1939-1945 and details of their rise and fall, presenting a picture of the Second World War as it was seen by the men who commanded the panzer divisions and the might of the Wehrmacht. Originally published in 1948.

Great Captains Unveiled incisively examines the brilliant military careers and intriguing personalities of six masters of the battlefield: Jenghiz Khan (1167?–1227) and Sabutai (1172?–1245), who led their Mongol cavalry into the heart of medieval Europe and shook the fabric of its civilization; the French Marechal de Saxe (1696-1750), one of the greatest generals of his age, a military prophet of rare foresight, and author of Reveries, a classic on the art of war; Gustavus Adolphus (1594–1632), the Swedish king during the Thirty Years War and the founder of the modern army, who emphasized officer education, national recruitment, and the combination of firepower and mobility; Wallenstein (1583–1634), champion of the Holy Roman Empire and Adolphus's formidable opponent, who proved to be a genius of maneuver and psychological warfare; and James Wolfe (1727–1759), whose flawless execution of one of the most daring amphibious operations in history virtually gave Canada to the British. Liddell Hart's penetrating, decisive studies of these great captains reveal not only their genius and impact, but offer relevant lessons that 20th-century military commanders have yet to fully reap.

Kniga vydajushhegosja anglijskogo voennogo istorika sjera Bjezila Liddela Garta — jeto poslednjaja glava nenapisannogo uchebnika evropejskoj voennoj nauki, itog chetyreh tysjacheletij razvitija iskusstva vojny. "Geometrija vojny", "vojna glazami shahmatista", "strategija kak tochnaja nauka" — vot lish' nekotorye harakteristiki jetogo neordinarnogo issledovanija. Glubina analiza, jenciklopedicheskij ohvat, prostota i dostupnost' izlozhenija delajut "Strategiju neprjamyh dejstvij" nezamenimoj dlja istinnyh ljubitelej voennoj istorii.

These are the letters - in the form of a frank and amusing diary - written by a private in Wellington's army who fought throughout the Napoleonic wars and it includes a colourful eye-witness account of the Battle of Waterloo. Private Wheeler's record covers the Peninsular Campaign, keeping order during the coronation of Louis XVIII whom he called "an old bloated poltroon" and his later posting to Corfu where he enjoyed reporting on the barbarous habits of the natives with obvious enjoyment. Wheeler wrote his accounts before the muskets of battle had cooled, and he was a master of lively anecdote and mischievous characterisation. Nothing escapes his sharp eyes, whether it is the local landscape or the looks of the local girls. Sir Basil Liddell Hart, the editor, joined the Army and served in the same regiment as Private Wheeler during the First World War. In 1937 he became personal advisor to the War Minister and was military correspondent to The Daily Telegraph from 1925-35 and to The Times until the outbreak of the Second World War. He lectured on strategy and tactics at staff colleges in numerous countries and wrote more than thirty books. He died in 1970.

Liddell Hart's History of the First World War

B. H. Liddell Hart believes that "thought working on thought is the most influential process in history. Yet, being intangible, it is less perceptible than the effects of action, and has always received far less attention than it deserves." In THE GHOST OF NAPOLEON, Liddell Hart concentrates on two of these intellections, each of which vitally affected the course of history in the last two centuries. One was responsible for the triumphs of Revolutionary France and for Napoleon's empire; the other, for that ruinous conflict called WW I. Liddell Hart is to military subjects what Peter Drucker is to business. Two of his best are THE SOVIET ARMY and GREAT CAPTAINS UNVEILED.

A Concise Account of All the Major Battles, Innovations, and Political Events of the First World War by an Important Military AnalystAn abridgement of the author’s History of the World War, 1914–1918 , and first published in 1936, World War I in Outline is a compact but comprehensive history of the “war to end all wars.” Divided into five parts representing each year of the war, Liddell Hart discusses the war on land, at sea, and in the air while skillfully incorporating the political events occurring at the same time. From his own experiences in the war and through studying the conflict in detail, the author developed and expressed his most important observation about military direct attacks against an enemy firmly in position should not be attempted. He also put forth the notion that battles are more often decided by the commander’s actions and not the armies themselves. A lively and engrossing read, World War I in Outline is an ideal overview in time for the centennial of one of the major wars in history.

Il libro ricostruisce l'ultimo conflitto mondiale nella complessa contradditorietà dei suoi sviluppi militari, in un quadro completo delle componenti che ne determinarono l'esito finale dall'Europa all'Estremo Oriente: la tattica e la strategia di vincitori e vinti; la potenza industriale al servizio degli eserciti in lotta; l'efficacia delle scelte tecniche e delle applicazioni tecnologiche realizzate nel campo degli armamenti, della guerra d'offesa e di difesa, dalle nazioni belligeranti. Un'esposizione densa, serrata, tutta basata sui fatti, che però non trascura la funzione decisiva svolta dal fattore uomo sulla condotta generale della guerra, dalla capacità degli opposti stati maggiori al genio militare dei singoli generali, al valore combattivo delle truppe.

Basil Liddell Hart is regarded as one of the greatest military thinker of the last century.In this extraordinary autobiography, he tells the story of his intellectual development.Prophetically, in the light of the years that followed, the draft of the official Infantry Training manual of 1921 was criticized in some military quarters as being too revolutionary, too sweeping, too different from established ideas and methods.Equally prophetic was that the younger and progressive elements in the British Army welcomed it as one of the most exciting, instructive and thought-provoking documents ever to come out as an official publication. Its author, a twenty-four year old Regular officer, a survivor of the Big Push on the Somme in July 1916, was Basil Liddell Hart.This first volume of his memoirs takes the reader to 1937. For Captain Liddell Hart these years were packed with incident. From infantry tactics his dynamic, questing mind led him to study the whole field of military affairs and defence strategy.Invalided to the half-pay list of the Army in 1924, he became military correspondent of first the Morning Post, then the Daily Telegraph and finally The Times, as well as military editor of the Encyclopædia Britannica. In a brilliant stream of articles, books, lectures he led that small group of enthusiasts who between the two world wars sought to lift the British Services from reactionary mediocrity to the state of powerful modern efficiency which they believed, all too correctly, to be essential for the future peace of the world.Liddell Hart’s name is synonymous with the Blitzkrieg concept of armoured warfare — indeed its most successful exponents say that he originated it — and in this book he details in full his struggle against ignorance and apathy to provide his country with an effective armoured force. But that is only one aspect of the book. His personal collection of papers and documents covering this period, and his correspondence and records of conversations with such figures as Churchill, Lawrence, Lloyd George, and the leading statesmen, soldiers and politicians of the last fifty years, is acknowledged to be one of the finest in the world.From these and from the uninhibited richness of his private notes and diaries, he has produced this unique contribution to history, as provocative and perhaps as controversial as anything he has written in his distinguished career.In the summer of 1938, believing that Britain was grossly unprepared for an imminent war and that he could help far more from the public platform than through the private ear, Liddell Hart gave up his advisory role.“The greatest military thinker of the 20th Century whose ideas have revolutionised the art of war” — GENERAL CHASSIN“Nearly all German tank strategy was based on Liddell Hart’s teachings” — GENERAL VON MELLENTHIN“The theoretical originator of mechanised warfare. I was one of his disciples” — GENERAL GUDERIAN“No expert on military affairs has better earned the right to respectful attention than Liddell Hart” — PRESIDENT KENNEDY“He still remains the foremost exponent of military matters in this country” — F.M. SIR CLAUDE AUCHINLECK“Britain’s greatest military historian of our times” — F.M. VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEINCaptain B.H. Liddell Hart (1895-1970) was an historian who made military history and theory interesting and understandable to the general reader. He was military writer for several London newspapers, as well as Military Editor of the ‘Encyclopaedia Britannica’. He was knighted in 1966.Endeavour Press is the UK's leading independent digital publisher.

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2022 Reprint of the 1925 Edition. Exact facsimile of the original edition and not reproduced with Optical Recognition Software. The foundation of Liddell Hart's theory of limited war emerged in the 1920s from his conviction that Europe's military leaders had lost sight of the true objective of war and consequently had mishandled the conduct of the First World War. Believing that the sole objective of war was the destruction of the main enemy army in great battles, they had pommeled each other mercilessly for four years in a massive struggle of attrition. The extraordinary cost of this effort was obvious to all, but Liddell Hart argued that it was also unnecessary and based upon an unsound principle. Using Hannibal's victory at Cannae and Moltke's at Sedan as examples, he asserted that "there are . . . plenty of negative examples to prove that the conquests of the main forces of the enemy are not synonymous with victory." Moreover, as the world war had revealed, attempts to achieve such an objective could too easily lead to wars of unlimited means, wars "in which the conductor does not know when to stop." "It implies," he continued, "that the end is pursued regardless of what lies beyond. The conductor allows the fighting instinct to usurp control of his reason." To restore this control, Liddell Hart asserted it was first necessary "to produce true grand strategists to replace the color-blind exponents of mass destruction who can only see red" by redefining the objective of war. This was the central theme of his first book on military affairs, Paris; or the Future of War, in which he wrote that the purpose of war was "To ensure a resumption of the peacetime policy with the shortest and least costly interruption of the normal life of the country". The future of war -- The origins of the false objective -- Permanent national objects -- The national objective in war -- Historical examples of the moral objective -- The means to the moral objective -- The air weapon -- Objections to the air-attack -- Are armies and navies obsolete? -- The naval weapon -- The army weapon -- The evolution of "new model" armies -- Epilogue.

Il libro ricostruisce l'ultimo conflitto mondiale nella complessa contradditorietà dei suoi sviluppi militari, in un quadro completo delle componenti che ne determinarono l'esito finale dall'Europa all'Estremo Oriente: la tattica e la strategia di vincitori e vinti; la potenza industriale al servizio degli eserciti in lotta; l'efficacia delle scelte tecniche e delle applicazioni tecnologiche realizzate nel campo degli armamenti, della guerra d'offesa e di difesa, dalle nazioni belligeranti. Un'esposizione densa, serrata, tutta basata sui fatti, che però non trascura la funzione decisiva svolta dal fattore uomo sulla condotta generale della guerra, dalla capacità degli opposti stati maggiori al genio militare dei singoli generali, al valore combattivo delle truppe.

In this short book Captain Liddell Hart has concentrated his learning in the history of modern warfare and his reflections upon its tendencies. The result is a book which will challenge contemporary theory and practice, and which has a poitical as well as a military relevance to our desings for the future.The author divides its subject into two parts. In the first, he describes the development of modern warfare in terms of the tools of war, from the growth of fire-power in the Napoleonic wars to the evolution of the tank. He corrects the impression which was formed in 1940 that the tank gives superiority always to the attack; on the one hand anti-tank technique has been evolving, and on the other hand the tank has proved its usefulness in defence. From mechanized warfare on the ground he turns to consider the value and limitations of air power: the prevailing use of which, in his views, leads to gradual attrition rather than to rapid decisions. Lastly he discusses the effect which the flying bomb and the rocket, as part of long range artillery warfare, may exert upon war in the future.In the second part of the book, Captain Liddell Hart deals with the purposes of modern war. He reviews, with masterly brevity, the history of warfare from the Middle Ages, and the various restrictions upon warfare acknowledged in feudal times. Unlimited warfare established itself with the wars of the French Revolution; another landmark was the American Civil War, which the author considers to have been in many ways the prototype of the modern 'total war'. He shows how these tendencies became accepted in military theory by the general misinterpretation of the work of Clausewitz, and were reinforced both by mechanical inventions and political and social causes. And the 'total war' is not only bad in itself, because of its destructiveness, but is bad because it produces the wrong kind of peace. Total war, in the author's words, is 'the combination of an unlimited aim, with an unlimited method'. He hopes for a 'revival of reason, sufficient to produce self-control in war, if not the abolition of war'.

Basil Liddell Hart is regarded as one of the greatest military thinker of the last century. The second volume of his Memoirs opens in the spring of 1937. The author had been long in the forefront of scientific historians and commentators on military, strategic and international affairs. His books, articles, papers, lectures, his columns as the Military Correspondent and a leader-writer of The Times had given him international status, even in Germany. When Chamberlain succeeded Baldwin as Prime Minister, he appointed Leslie Hore-Belisha as his War Minister, with instructions that he wanted to see ‘drastic changes’. Within a few weeks, Hore-Belisha had enlisted Liddell Hart into what he called the ‘partnership’. The combination of the far-sighted, zealous reformer and the dynamic, ambitious politician was to achieve real progress towards modernisation of the Army. It was a partnership that perhaps saved Britain from complete destruction in Hitler’s war; pursued to the end, it would certainly have saved her countless setbacks, thousands of lives, and much moral and economic damage in the years that followed. The circumstances of the dissolution of the ‘partnership’ set the pattern for the remainder of the book and reflect the grim events which culminated in the collapse of France in 1940. Liddell-Hart memoirs give an unparalleled account of the forces and personalities which governed those years, seen from a unique, inside viewpoint at the top. Here is appeasement, inertia, resistance to change, evasiveness and folly in high places, recorded in new and terrible detail as they tumble one after another in a mad helter-skelter to a war fought at the wrong time, in the wrong places, for the wrong reasons. For the author there was personal distress. Throughout the twenties and the thirties his views on future warfare had often been rejected as impracticable in his own country — only to be adopted by her enemies. He, more than anybody, knew the power of his theories when put to practical use, how they could be combated, and how grossly ill-equipped Britain and her Allies were to do so. Now, with the Chamberlain Government’s amazing volte-face from appeasement to muddle-headed belligerence, his realism was derided as unwarranted pessimism. It was no consolation to him that when the attack came, the German assaults followed exactly the patterns he had predicted for so long. “The greatest military thinker of the 20th Century whose ideas have revolutionised the art of war” — GENERAL CHASSIN “Nearly all German tank strategy was based on Liddell Hart’s teachings” — GENERAL VON MELLENTHIN “The theoretical originator of mechanised warfare. I was one of his disciples” — GENERAL GUDERIAN “No expert on military affairs has better earned the right to respectful attention than Liddell Hart” — PRESIDENT KENNEDY “He still remains the foremost exponent of military matters in this country” — F.M. SIR CLAUDE AUCHINLECK “Britain’s greatest military historian of our times” — F.M. VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN Captain B.H. Liddell Hart (1895-1970) was an historian who made military history and theory interesting and understandable to the general reader. He was military writer for several London newspapers, as well as Military Editor of the ‘Encyclopaedia Britannica’. He was knighted in 1966. Endeavour Press is the UK's leading independent digital publisher.

FOCH THE MAN OF ORLEANS By CAPTAIN B. H. LIDDELL HART With Illustrations BOSTON LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY 1932 Wide World Photot MARSHAL FOCH Copyright, pj, 1932, BY B. H. LIDDBLL HART All rights reserved Published February, 1932 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS BOOKS ARE PUBLISHED BY LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY COMPANY PRINTED IN TUB UNITED STATES or AMERICA To FOUR GOOD FRIENDS E. D. S. E. G. H. F. A. P. F. B. A. FOR GOOD TURNS PREFACE THIS book does not pretend to be an official biography, al though General Weygand has generously helped me in collecting and checking facts, as well as in giving me his impressions on certain issues. The more tribute is due to him because he has not sought in any way to influence my judgment. As he has refrained from imposing any conditions in return for his aid, it is all the more just that I should make it clear that he has no responsibility for the conclusions reached in this book. I realize that these conclusions may impair the popular con ception of Marshal Fochs achievement, if not of his spirit. No one will regret such an effect more than I do. For it has been with reluctance that I have yielded my own original con ception in face of the facts laid bare by research into the history of the war. If I may appear critical, I can only say that I have kept my criticism on a tight rein while giving the facts free rein as true history requires. Such criticisms as I make are implicit in the facts, which cannot be burked. And I have purposely restrained criticism because of a feeling that the indefinable effect of Fochs spirit may have endowed his actions with more effect than the facts convey. It is my strongest hopethat the book will in no sense be regarded as an attack on or exposure of Foch. It certainly brings out his too absorbing devotion to the offensive in the theory and practice of war and the grave conse quences not only to France but to her allies. But, this ques tion apart, the book is really an analysis of the limitations which high command suffered under the conditions of the World War. The effective influence of the higher commander was thwarted by the difficulty not only of knowing the facts of the situation but of knowing them in time to take action which fitted them before they had changed. As for my criticism of the offensive doctrine, it does not viii PREFACE exceed the way Marshal Foch himself castigates that too exclusive passion for the offensive and the useless repulses and cruel losses thereby caused My supplement has merely been to trace Marshal Fochs own influence in fostering that too exclusive passion which caused such useless repulses and cruel losses not only in 1914, but later. CONTENTS PREFACE I Two NAPOLEONS II THE STAMP OF DESTINY HI THE FOUNDATIONS OF A FAITH IV THE PLAYTHINGS OF FATE V THE MISSION AND THE MOULD VI Two REVOLUTIONS VII THE LAUNCHING OF THE WAR VIII THE BLIND COLLISION IX THE MIRACLE OF THE MARNE . . . . X THE WATCHMAN OF YPRES XI DEADLOCK XII GAS XIII BLUNTING THE SWORD OF FRANCE . . . . XIV 1916 THE CREEPING SHADOW XV 1917 IN THE SHADOW XVI THE STORM BREAKS XVII THE TRIALS OF FAITH XVIII THE WORST TRIAL XIX THE TURN OF THE TIDE XX THE ROLLING BALL OR THE EBBING TIDE XXI TouT LE MONDE A LA BATAILLE . . . XXII THE TRIUMPH OF THE VOCAL WILL . . . . XXIII THE CLUTCH ON THE RHINE XXIV THE REFLEXIVE YEARS EPILOGUE BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX vn 3 13 23 33 4 5067 75 100 122 148 170 179 207 234 263 292 313 330 340 363 39 407 4 28 448 459 465 ILLUSTRATIONS MARSHAL FOCH Frontispiece FOCHS BIRTHPLACE IN TARBES 6 THE Two FRIENDS GENERALS FOCH AND WILSON . 52 AN ALLIED CONFERENCE IN FRANCE . . . .186 FocH ON THE FIELD 278 A CONFERENCE OF THE ALLIES 346 FOCH IN THE RAILWAY COACH AT THE SIGNING OF THE ARMISTICE 402 BATTLE FLAGS BEING ACCEPTED BY FOCH FOR PRES ERVATION IN THE HOTEL DBS INVALIDES . . . 440 MAPS THE FRENCH AND GERMAN PLANS, AUGUST 1914 . 71 THE BATTLE OF MORHANGE, AUGUST 20, 1914 . ...

This book provides a study of the military leadership of Marshall Foch, the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in World War I. This has a fantastic introduction to the politics of coordination of war among the Allies and the personalities involved. Includes several good maps.